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THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT: ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
VEILED IN AN ANTI-TERRORISM PRETEXT
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center and the 1995
Oklahoma City bombings, the American people no longer view
terrorism as an act that only takes place on foreign soil.'
These incidents brought terrorism to the "forefront of American
public interest"2 and thereby placed pressure on the federal
legislature to respond. The result was a bi-partisan congressio-
nal venture, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act3 ("AEDPA7 or "the Act"), which was signed into law on
April 24, 1996 by President William J. Clinton.'
' The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City occurred on Feb-
ruary 26, 1993. On April 19, 1995, a bomb exploded in the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing eighteen people and injuring another
500. This was declared the worst terrorist incident ever to take place in the Unit-
ed States. RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TERRORIm
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (Issue Brief, May 23, 1996).
2 RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TERRORIS , THE Fu-
TURE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Issue Brief, July 3, 1996).
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
4 Perl, supra note 1, at 2. Upon signing the legislation, President Clinton
voiced opposition to the immigration provision in the bill, calling them 'ill.advised"
and stating that they "reach beyond the scope of counter terrorism efforts." Rich-
ard C. Reuben, McDeportation" The New Anti-terrorism Law Allows Border Guards
to Summarily Exclude Aliens Without documents, 82 A.B.A J. 34 (Aug. 1996).
The various provisions of the AEDPA include: habeas corpus restrictions,
victim's rights provisions, exceptions to foreign immunity for civil damage suits
against foreign states for death or personal injury resulting from certain terrorist
acts, alien terrorist removal procedures, provisions relating to explosive tagging,
controls over terrorist funding and prohibitions against financial transactions with
terrorist states, assistance to countries that aid terrorist states or that provide
military assistance to them, proscriptions concerning misuse of nuclear materials;
and restrictions on biological and chemical weapons. See generally AEDPA, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
15, 18, 22 28, 40, 42, 50, U.S.C.).
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Hidden within this legislation is an unprecedented restric-
tion of the constitutional rights and judicial resources tradi-
tionally afforded to legal resident aliens.' The AEDPA re-
vamps alien removal procedures by eliminating judicial review
after a final deportation order premised upon an enumerated
conviction.6 The Act also substantially expands the definition
of those crimes that give rise to a deportation order.' Working
in conjunction, these components of the AEDPA create a law
6 "Terrorism-related provisions aside, the [AEDPA] contains several more and
farther reaching revisions of immigration law. For example, aliens who enter the
U.S. without inspection will now be subject to removal through exclusion proceed-
ings rather that deportation proceedings, regardless of how long that they have
resided here . .. [various categories of deportable crimes are expanded, the time-
table for deportation is shortened . . . ." Perl, supra note 2, at 10.
' Subsequent to the enactment of the AEDPA, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (MIIRIA!). Pub. L. No. 104-
208, Div. C., 1996 U.S.C.A.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.). Aspects of the AEDPA has been modified by IIRIRA. See, e.g.,
AEDPA 440(a), 110 Stat. at 1276-77 (repealed by IIRIRA 1996) and IIRIRA
309(c)(4)(G), U.S.C.A.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 3009-626 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1101) (Supp.
II 1996). Analysis of the legislative history of IIRIRA is beyond the scope of the
Note. However, the AEDPA & the IIRIRA remain substantively similar. Thus, this
Note's critique of the scope and effects generated by the AEDPA are applicable to
its corollary.
' Various constitutional challenges to the AEDPA continue to mount; however,
the issue of the constitutionality of the criminal alien removal procedures within
the statute have yet to be considered by the Supreme Court. The bulk of these
challenges have concerned the retroactive application of the statute. See Reyes-
Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1996) (the AEDPA's removal of jurisdic-
tion for appellate review of petitions for discretionary waivers may not be retroac-
tively applied where alien admitted deportability prior to statute's enactment). Cf.
Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996); Mendez-Rsas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672
(5th Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996). An interesting
case that addressed the AEDPA is Lewin v. INS, No. 94-70867, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16346 (9th Cir. June 17, 1996), where the Ninth Circuit bypassed the con-
stitutional and jurisdictional issues posed by the legislation, and decided the case
on the "balance of equities" standard that was in place prior to the AEDPA's en-
actment. In applying the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, the court cited "the
difficult, even arcane, issues regarding retroactivity and constitutionality" of the
AEDPA. Id. at *2. See also Zavala-Zaragoza v. INS, 92 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded a case to be considered in light of
the AEDPA, where the issue was whether, upon an alien's conviction for a narcot-
ics offense, the alien must demonstrate unusual or countervailing equities prior to
exclusion of the deportation order. INS v. Elramly, 117 S. Ct. 31 (1996). The
Ninth Circuit had held that the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") had abused
its discretion in denying the alien's petition for discretionary relief from deporta-
tion without first considering the nature of the offense and how it reflects on the
undesirability of the alien as a permanent resident. INS v. Elramly, 49 F.3d 535
(9th Cir. 1995).
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that "threaten[s] the most basic safeguards of due process and
seek[s] to eliminate a meaningful role for the judiciary to per-
form its historic function of reviewing the implementation ofimmigration law."' Simultaneously, these constitutionally
questionable provisions of the AEDPA possess a limited, if any,
nexus between the purported purpose of the legislation and its
practical effect.'
Part I of this Note details the pre-AEDPA criminal alien
removal procedures applicable to permanent residents who are
deportable due to a conviction of an enumerated offense. It
then describes the AEDPA's expansion of those criminal of-
fenses which provide the grounds for final orders of deporta-
tion,"° and the summary elimination of judicial review of such
orders mandated by section 440(a) of the Act. Part H exam-
ines the scope of congressional authority to delegate adjudica-
tive powers to non-Article II tribunals within the context of
the plenary power that Congress has traditionally enjoyed overimmigration law. This section analyzes the broad concentration
of power granted to the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice ("INS") that is manifest in the AEDPA legislation, and the
resulting conflict between this concentration and the constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers.
This Note then addresses the practical effect that the
AEDPA has upon the constitutional rights traditionally afford-
ed to legal aliens. Part IH discusses how the Act implicates
Rhonda MccMillion, Immigration Rights a Concerm ABA Questions Bill Re.
stricting Asylum, Benefits for Legal Aliens, 82 A.B.A. J. 90 (Feb. 1996).
' It has been contended that "filronically, the new law gives the terrorists it
was designed to reach more legal protections than many D immigrants... "
Reuben, supra note 4, at 34 (quoting Brian K. Bates, an immigration lawyer with
Quan, Burdette, & Perez in Houston, TX- "Suspected terrorists under the Act have
the right to appointed counsel, the right to bond proceedings, the right to a court
hearing, and the right to judicial review in removal proceedings .... ) (emphasis
added).
0 IRIRA renames the process formerly known as 'deportation proceedings" as
"removal proceedings." See IRIRA § 304(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229-1229a (Supp. H
1996). As the AEDPA was signed into law prior to URIRA, this Note will continue
to refer to an order expelling a legal resident alien as a deportation order, result-
ing from deportation proceedings.
" Within the context of immigration law, individuals who are not citizens or
nationals of the United States are referred to as 'aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)
(1994). A legal alien is one who has attained permanent resident status through
either §§ 245A, 210, 210A, or 249 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1155a, 1160, 1161, 1259
(1994).
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resident aliens' constitutionally protected liberty interest
through its elimination of judicial review of final deportation
orders. This elimination is then subjected to a due process
analysis, which concludes that judicial review is a necessary
procedural safeguard to a legal alien's liberty interest, and as
such, the AEDPA is constitutionally infirm as applied to lawful
resident aliens. Finally, Part IV suggests legislative amend-
ments that may be made to the criminal aliens removal provi-
sions of the AEDPA, so as to minimize the conflict between its
enforcement and the constitutional rights granted to legal
permanent residents.
I. THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FOLLOWING A CONvIc-
TION FOR AN ENUMERATED OFFENSE: INS PROCEDURE
BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE AEDPA
Before discussing the ramifications of the AEDPA on alien
removal procedures, it is necessary to delineate those proce-
dures in place prior to the enactment of the legislation. A re-
view of pre-AEDPA criminal alien removal procedures and a
description of the AEDPA's expansion of those offenses that
give rise to a final order of deportation highlight how the Act's
elimination of judicial review encroach upon the constitutional
rights previously guaranteed to legal aliens.
A. The Pre-AEDPA Criminal Alien Removal Procedures
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, legal aliens were
deportable upon conviction of any one of a set of narrowly
defined, enumerated crimes. These offenses were characterized
by their gravity, and included all aggravated felonies, drug
trafficking, firearms offenses, and crimes relating to national
security, such as espionage.12 The deportation orders for
which these convictions were a condition precedent remained
subject to judicial review. This circuit court review acted as a
procedural safeguard protecting legal aliens from the potential
12 AUsTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS:
A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE, 7-56 to 7-91 (3d. ed. 1994).
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abuse of the discretion afforded to INS officials and ensured
that the limited rights granted to these individuals were not
violated.
It is important to note that this judicial review was nei-
ther immediately nor unequivocally granted. While sec-
tion 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
provided that the "sole and exclusive procedure" for review of a
final deportation order was the filing of a petition order for
review with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,1 pri-
or to the filing of this petition, the alien must have exhausted
all administrative remedies available to her. " Additionally,
the INS district director in the district where the reviewing
court is located had to be served with the petition.'" General-
ly, an automatic stay of deportation was granted pending de-
termination of a petition for review, 6 during which time
aliens in custody pending deportation were able to file a writ of
habeas corpus.'7 Thus, a complex set of INS procedures pro-
tected the mechanism of judicial review from unwarranted or
groundless appeals.
If an appeal was granted, the circuit court could reevalu-
ate many of the factors determined by the tribunal that led to
the finding of deportability. A final order of deportation had to
be based on "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence,""8
and in order to affirm, the appellate court needed to find that
the decision was based upon "substantial" evidence upon re-
viewing the record as a whole.' Moreover, the finding of fact
conducted by the tribunal was held to be conclusive when sup-
ported by "reasonable, substantial and probative evidence.'
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the circuit courts
were also charged with correcting errors of law within the
- 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1994).
15 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(7) (1994). The deportation order could have been exe-
cuted prior to the service of the petition for review. Id.
16 FRAGONEN & BELL, supra note 12, at 8-16. Aliens who were convicted of
aggravated felonies were generally not entitled to an automatic stay. Additionally,
these individuals had a reduced period in which to seek review. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a)(1), (3) (1994).
17 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10)(c) (1994).
" Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1994).
20 Id-
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deportation proceeding. The court was also to note any lack of
conformity to constitutional provisions evident in the proceed-
ing.2' In essence, the court reviewed the procedure that gave
rise to the final order of deportation to ensure that the pro-
ceeding did not violate the alien's due process rights. The
AEDPA eliminated this judicial review.22
1. The AEDPA's Elimination of Francis" Discretionary
Waiver of Deportation
Francis relief, a judicially created right of appeal, ' per-
mitted a legal permanent resident alien, who had accumulated
the requisite seven years of lawful, unrelinquished domicile, to
petition for a discretionary waiver of a final deportation or-
der.'m Francis relief provided lawful resident aliens with a
procedural safeguard to protect against an abuse of discretion
in an INS deportation determination. The discretionary waiver
helped to ensure equity prior to the deprivation of liberty that
necessarily accompanies a deportation order.26 Thus, Francis
t See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6
(1948). Generally, when interpreting the governing statute or regulation, the court
was to give deference to the construction favored by the INS. However, when it
was a deportation statute, the court was to construe it in favor of the alien. See
generally INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
2' Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
2" The Second Circuit extended § 212(c) discretionary waiver of exclusion of the
INA to deportation proceedings based upon the equal protection doctrine. The
court determined that there was no rational basis to distinguish between long-time
residents in a deportation proceeding and those in exclusion proceedings. Francis,
532 F.2d at 272. This decision was adopted by the INS. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra
note 12, at 7-65. "[This] was sensible because failure to provide the relief in de-
portation proceedings only encouraged long-time residents to leave the country and
seek readmission in order to be put into exclusion proceedings where the relief
could be sought." FRAGOMIEN & BELL, supra note 12 at 7-65. Because of this ori-
gin, a legal alien would not be eligible for Francis relief unless the alien is simi-
larly situated to those aliens excludable under § 212(c). In re Granados, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 726 (BIA 1979). Thus, no Francis relief may be afforded to those aliens
who are convicted of an aggravated felony where they are sentenced to more than
five years in prison as there is not comparable grounds for exclusion. 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994). For the same reason, those aliens who are convicted of a
firearms offense covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) of the INA are not eligible for
the discretionary waiver. See In re Hernandez-Casillas, 983 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.
1993).
" FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 12, at 7-67.
26 FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 12, at 8-23. See, e.g., Diaz-Resendez v. INS,
1386 [Vol. 63:1381
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relief implicitly recognized the heightened protection to be af-
forded legal aliens' liberty interests, as opposed to those of
illegal aliens, for whom such relief was not availableY
Francis relief was granted on the basis of a balance of
equities presented by the legal alien during deportation pro-
ceedings." Factors deemed favorable in the circuit court's
analysis included: (1) family connections in the United States;
(2) period of residence (particularly where this for a long dura-
tion with its inception at a young age); (3) evidence of hardship
that may occur to both the alien and her family if deportation
is to occur; (4) history of employment; (5) the existence of ei-
ther property or business ties; (6) evidence of community ser-
vice; and (7) proof of rehabilitation. 9 Factors that weighed
unfavorably included: (1) the nature of the conviction which
provided a basis for deportation; (2) the existence of a criminal
record; and (3) the presence of other evidence that is deemed
indicative of bad character, such as other violations of immi-
gration law."0
The function that Francis relief performed in safeguarding
an alien's liberty interest is illustrated in Diaz-Resendez v.
INS." Diaz-Resendez became a lawful resident alien at the
age of seventeen years old. 2 He had been married to an
American citizen for twenty-nine years, and was the father of
960 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1992) (court reversed as arbitrary a BIA determination that
resident alien had failed to demonstrate unusual or outstanding equities).
27 I&
"See, e.g., In re Matin, 16 L & N. Dec. 581 (1978).
9 Id. at 584-85. See also In re Matter of Edwards 10 . & N. Dec. 506 (1963);
In re Matter of GA., 7 I. & N. Dec 274 (1956); In re Matter of F., 6 L & N. Dec
537 (1955); In re Matter of S., 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1954); In re Matter of M., 5 L
& N. Dec. 598 (1954); In re Matter of G.Y.G., 4 L & N. Dec. 211 (1950); In re
Matter of M., 3 L & N. Dec. 804 (1949) (seventh proviso); In re Matter of V. L, 3
L & N. Dec. 571 (1949) (seventh proviso).
" In re Maria, 16 .& N. Dec. at 584. See, e.g., In re Carrasco, Interim Deci-
sion 2579 (BIA 1977), affd on other grounds, Carrasco-Favela v. INS, 563 F.2d
1220 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Edwards, 10 L & N. Dec. 506 (1963); In re M., 3 I. &
N. Dec. 804 (1949); In re V., I. & N. Dec. 293 (1942) (seventh proviso); In re G., 1
I. & N. Dec. 8 (1940) (seventh proviso).
It should be noted that as the perceived gravity of the crime the alien is
convicted of increases, so does the level of equities that must be shown. Cordoba-
Chaves v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244, 1247 (7th Cir. 1991).
2' 60 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Akdnyemi v. INS, 969 F.2d 285, 289-90
(7th Cir. 1992) (case remanded due to BIA failure to consider rehabilitation as a
positive factor in the balance of the equities).
IDiazz-Resendez, 60 F.2d at 493.
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six children who were all born in the United States." Two of
those children were married adults, while the other four still
resided at home. One of these children needed special educa-
tion due to an injury sustained in a bicycle accident.34 Diaz-
Resendez's income averaged about $5000 a year from his work
as a carpenter, construction worker and field hand. Diaz-
Resendez was in good health, but his wife suffered from a
dehabilatative medical condition.35 Thus, he was the primary
source of income for his family.
36
On October 28, 1985, Diaz-Resendez was arrested at an
INS check point after marijuana was found in the back of the
car he was driving. 7 He explained that he agreed to sell the
marijuana because of the dire financial straits facing his fami-
ly. After he pled guilty to possession with the intent to distrib-
ute, the judge suspended all but four months of his three-year
prison sentence. s
Subsequently, the INS ordered Diaz-Resendez's deporta-
tion.39 Evidence in favor of the discretionary waiver presented
at his deportation hearing included proof of employment and
earnings, a favorable letter from his probation officer, and
several other letters of recommendation.40 The immigration
judge denied the request for relief and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals ("BIA") affirmed this decision.4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA, hold-
ing that the court "abused its discretion by inexplicably de-
parting from established precedent and failing to consider and
meaningfully address the positive equities and favorable evi-
dence when reaching its decision."42 The court determined
that the BIA subjected Diaz-Resendez's to disparate treatment
without explanation, as other individuals with less favorable





"' Diaz-Resendez, 60 F.2d at 494.
" Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 495.
41 Id.
4' Diaz-Resendez, 60 F.2d at 498.
, Id. at 497. See Matter of Buscemi, Interim Decision 3058 (April 13, 1988);
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went on to note Diaz-Resendez' enduring period of residence
and the hardship that his deportation would cause his family.
These factors, coupled with his successful probation and ab-
stention from criminal activity since his conviction, led the
court to vacate and remand the deportation order."
Fortunately for Diaz-Resendez, who would have been de-
ported upon an order later found to be an abuse of agency
discretion," his case was decided prior to the enactment of
the AEDPA. The AEDPA's summary elimination of judicial
review would have compelled his deportation, despite the fact
that this order resulted from proceedings which were found
"arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law."8 The AEDPA's re-
moval of the Francis discretionary waiver of deportation thus
destroys the delicate balance that had been reached between
the integrity of criminal alien removal procedures and lawful
resident aliens' constitutionally protected liberty interests.
B. The Enumerated Crimes Which Provide the Substantive
Grounds for Final Orders of Deportation
Even prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the substance
of those offenses which gave rise to a final order of deporta-
tion47 varied in both degree of seriousness and clarity. For
see also Israel v. INS, 785 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1986); Martinez-Montoya v.
INS, 904 F.2d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1990).
"Diaz-Resendez, 60 F.2d at 497-98.
Id. See also Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Bal v. Moyer, 883 F.2d 45
(7th Cir. 1989).
"DiazResendez, 60 F.2d at 497-98. Deference is generally given to the INA
determinations, unless persuasive factors exist that indicate the BIA erred. Id. See
also Zamora-Morel v. INS, 905 F.2d 833, 838 n,2 (5th Cir. 1990); Bladcwood v.
INS, 803 F.2d 1165 (11th Cir. 1986).
" Section 440(a) of the AEDPA revised § 106(a) of the INA to read:
Any final order of deportation against any alien who is deportable
by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section
241(a)(2)(ii)(B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section
241(a)(2)CA)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review in any court.
Section 241(a)(2)(B) of the INA permits the deportation of aliens convicted of
an offense related to a controlled substance, such as a marijuana offense, drug
addiction and drug abuse. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 12, at 7-59. In case3 of
a single conviction for marijuana possession, the weight of the amount posessed
must exceed 30 grams. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX2)(B)I) (1994). Section 241(a(2{CC) of
the INA addresses the deportation of any alien convicted of purchasing, posessing,
selling, offering for sale, using, owning, or carrying in violation of the law, "any
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example, a pre-AEDPA ground for deportation included those
persons who have twice been convicted of "crimes of moral
turpitude." This broad and vague category of criminal con-
duct can encompass a conviction ranging from embezzlement to
shoplifting. °
Yet the AEDPA has expanded the definition of the enu-
merated crimes which may provide the substantive grounds for
deportation. For example, the pre-AEDPA Immigration and
Nationality Act provided for the deportation of any alien con-
victed of an "aggravated felony,"5' which included such crimes
as drug trafficking and murder.52 The AEDPA enlarged the
meaning of this term, so to include such acts as gambling of-
fenses, prostitution crimes, and failure to appear before the
court."3 The AEDPA's similar treatment of such diverse of-
fenses, coupled with the expansion in scope and definition of
deportable crimes, has led to particularly harsh results for
minor crimes. Moreover, the breadth of these AEDPA revisions
harbors the potential for widespread abuse of discretion
through arbitrary and erratic enforcement by INS officials.5
weapon part or accessory that is a firearm or destructive device." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(14) (1994). Weapons considered to be destructive devices, and are thus
covered by this section, are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1994). Sec-
tion 241(a)(2)(D) of the INA allows for the deportation of any alien convicted un-
der the Selective Service Act, espionage statutes, or of any offense concerning with
the national defense, if the INS designates that alien as an "undesirable resident"
of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(D) (1994). For a discussion of the fac-
tors that are considered when making such a determination, see In re S., 5 . &
N. Dec. 425 (1953).
49 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (1994). The crimes which lead to this result
may not arise from a single criminal scheme; however, they may be the result of
a single trial. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 12, at 7-55. Moreover, judicial rec-
ommendations against deportation have been eliminated from this provision by the
1990 amendments to the INA. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 12, at 7-55.
" See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 108 n.46 (1998).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994). Conviction of such an offense any time
after entry may lead to deportation. The term "aggravated felony" includes "mur-
der, any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance or in any destructive devices,
any offense relating to the laundering of monetary instruments, any crime of vio-
lence for which the term of imprisonment imposed . . . is at least five years, or
any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act." FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra
note 12, at 7-56 (citing INA § 101(a)(43)).
52 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(iii) (1994).
See AEDPA § 440(e)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (Supp. II 1996)).
" See Amanda Masters, Is Procedural Due Process in a Remote Processing
Center a Contradiction in Terms? Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration
[Vol. 63:1381
1997] THEANTI-TERRORISMANDEFFECTIVEDEATHPENALTYACT 1391
For example, under the AEDPA, marijuana use leads to the
same result as an espionage offense, in that summary deporta-
tion without review by an Article I3 tribunal would be neces-
sarily enforced. In both these instances judicial review is elim-
inated-despite how long the legal permanent resident has
resided in the United States, how many of his or her family
members are now citizens, or how productive, law abiding, or
rehabilitated the individual has been since his or her convic-
tion. A legal alien's constitutionally protected liberty interest is
thus left unprotected from arbitrary and unjust deportation
determinations."
C. AEDPA Provision at Issue
Section 440 of the AEDPA amends section 106(a) of the
INA5 to read: "Any final order of deportation against an alien
who is deportable by reason of having committed [an enumer-
ated offense], shall not be subject to review by any court." Es-
sentially, regardless of whether a deportation proceeding was
conducted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, this INS de-
termination is not subject to judicial review. Due process re-
quirements have evolved into a purely inter-agency inquiry, as
the INS regulates itself without the traditional check provided
by judicial oversight. 7 Essentially, the AEDPA's elimination
of the safeguard of Francis relief leaves all final deportation
determinations predicated upon an expanded number of enu-
merated offenses vulnerable to due process violations; thus, the
Act renders the liberty interest possessed by resident aliens
unprotected.
Appeals, 57 OHiO ST. L.J. 999, 1025 n.5 (1996).
"Note that the AEDPA also severely limits the availability of § 212(c) relief
(discretionary waiver of excludability for long-time permanent resident returning
from trips abroad). 8 U.SC.§ 1182(c) (1994). The waiver, which was traditionally
applicable to all grounds of exclusion except for those security related or when the
immigrant was an aggravated felon who had served term of at least five years in
prison, was limited by § 440(d) of the AEDPA. As it now stands, waiver relief has
been eliminated. See supra note 6.
" For a discussion of this provision prior to the enactment of the AEDPA see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
IThe BIA may still hear such challenges. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 12,
at 8-3. For a discussion of circuit court reversals of BIA determinations premised
upon factual and legal errors, see infra note 136.
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II. ARTICLE III CONSIDERATIONS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
CONCERNS
Theoretically, the congressional authority to preclude judi-
cial review of deportation orders via section 440(a) of the
AEDPA may be justified by two constitutional doctrines. The
first holds that Article III, section 1 of the United States Con-
stitution empowers Congress to limit (and even eliminate) the
jurisdiction of Article III courts.58 This principle would permit
Congress to eliminate circuit court review of final deportation
orders premised upon virtually any ground that Congress
desires to articulate. A corollary justification, to be read in
conjunction with this power to limit jurisdiction, is premised
upon Congress' ability to delegate adjudicative functions to
Article I tribunals. 9 The second justification that supports
Congress' power to eliminate Article III review of deportation
orders in the AEDPA is the plenary power which Congress has
traditionally enjoyed over matters of immigration law.6"
While these justifications appear to provide ample support
for the AEDPA's section 440(a) revisions, upon closer scrutiny
it is evident that they collide with the constitutional principle
of separation of powers. When removed from a purely theoreti-
cal framework, the justifications lose their potency. Placing
section 440(a) of the AEDPA within the context of a separation
of powers analysis illustrates that the Act runs contrary to
both the constitutional guarantees traditionally afforded legal
aliens and traditional notions of fairness and justice.
A. Article III Limitations and Article I Delegations
Article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution
states "[tihe judicial power of the United States shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.""1 From this
clause developed the now "well-established principle that feder-
58 U.S. Cont. art. III, § 1.
5' See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, (1988).
" This justification is discussed within the context of a due process challenge
to the AEDPA. See infra Part III.
61 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
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al courts... are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by
Congress." 2 With regard to the AEDPA, this doctrine must be
read simultaneously with the judicially created practice of
delegating adjudicative functions to non-Article I tribunals.
Congress' power to delegate adjudicative functions to exec-
utive agencies carries with it an implicit responsibility to pro-
tect the integrity of such power. To this end, it has been stat-
ed:
Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in courts whose judges enjoy tenure
during good behavior and protection against reduction in salary. By
nearly universal consensus, the most plausible construction of this
language would hold that if Congress creates any adjudicative bod-
ies at all, it must grant them the protections of judicial indepen-
dence that are contemplated by Article uI.L
Yet, despite the possibility of such a common sense con-
struction, Chief Justice Marshall supported a less stringent
interpretation of Congress' delegatory powers. The 1828 deci-
sion in American Ins. Co. v. Canter left abandoned any hope
of "Article I literalism" and administrative adjudication as it
is now understood came to exist.' Congress may exercise an
almost unfettered power to create adjudicative Article I tribu-
nals,6" none of which must possess the Article III safeguards
tojudicial independence, such as life tenure and undiminished
salaries.' In the absence of such protections, administrative
agencies function outside of the principle of the independent
adjudicator.' Within this severe framework, it appears that
' Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). See also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) ("there can be no question of the power that the
power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction marked out by Con-
gress") (citing Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (Congress 'may
give, withhold or restrict jurisdiction at its discretioe)).
See Fallon supra note 59, at 916.
" 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
Fallon, supra note 59, at 917.
William W. Millard, Eroding the Separation of Powers= Congressional En-
croachment on Federal Judicial Power: CFTC u. Schor, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 669,
669-70 (1987).
These tribunals may create statutory rights, define these rights, assign bur-
dens of proof, and delegate the adjudication of disputes that arise as a result of
these special tribunals. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982).
Fallon, supra note 59, at 919. Professor Fallon suggests that Article HII liter-
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section 440(a) of the AEDPA fits neatly within accepted no-
tions of broad congressional delegatory powers as delineated by
constitutional law.69
However, AEDPA's broad and harsh immigration revisions
should not be read in a theoretical vacuum. It remains the
unique ability of the judiciary to keep congressional actions
within the limits to which it is assigned by the Constitution, as
"[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts."7 The Supreme Court has noted this
role, citing the Framers intent that the judiciary "stand inde-
pendent of the Executive and the Legislature" and "guarantee
that the process of adjudication itself remained impartial."1'
Thus, courts must review Congress' exercise of jurisdic-
tional limitation as exhibited in section 440(a) of the AEDPA
against the backdrop of the separation of powers doctrine.
Such a framework is necessary in order to determine whether
the elimination of Article III review of final deportation orders
is an illegitimate encroachment upon the powers of the judicial
alism is impractical, but notes that the doctrine and institutions that emanate
from the abandonment of such a reading may threaten the values that provide at
the basis for Article III. Fallon, supra note 59, at 919.
The inequities that may play out in the absence of independent adjudication
upon the application of the AEDPA's alien removal proceedings was noted by
Judge Jack B. Weinstein in Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(retroactive application of the AEDPA "flies in the face of what appears to be
Congress's design in enacting [the statute]").
69 As such, the few circuits that have heard challenges to the AEDPA predicat-
ed on this broad concentration of power transferred to the executive have upheld
the AEDPA. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996). In Kolster u.
INS, the First Circuit held "[blecause . . . some avenue for judicial review remains
available to address core constitutional concerns, we find that section 440(a)'s
repeal of our jurisdiction to review final orders does not raise a constitutional
issue." Id. at 971. This was despite the AEDPA's repeal of statutory authority for
habeas review of final deportation orders in § 106(a)(10) of the INA. Id.
70 THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
The importance and necessity of the judiciary's power to review the constitutional-
ity of legislation as was indoctrinated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177-78 (1803). ("lit is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.") This doctrine collides with the plenary power
the Supreme Court has emphasized Congress enjoys over immigration law. See
infra note 100 and accompanying text.
71 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50, 58
(1992). "A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is
essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of the government." United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980). See also Millard, supra note 66, at 669 n.2.
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branch. The appropriate Article HI analysis is set forth in
Commodities Futures Trading Commission CCFTC") v.
Schor,2 where the Supreme Court stated, "the constitutional-
ity of a given congressional delegation of adjudicative functions
to a non-Article III body must be assessed by reference to the
purposes underlying the requirements of Article III."7'
B. The Schor Test
In Schor, the Court articulated several factors to be con-
sidered when an act of Congress insulates an issue from Arti-
cle III review, thereby potentially threatening the integrity of
the judicial branch.74 These factors include: (1) the degree to
which the "essential attributes of power" are reserved to Arti-
cle III courts, and the extent that the agency exercises the
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article II
courts; (2) the importance of the right to be adjudicated; and
(3) the concerns that prompted Congress to depart from Article
III norms.
75
1. Factors One and Two: The Nature of Article EEI Review
of Administrative Actions
A strong presumption in favor of judicial review of admin-
istrative actions has been well established by the Supreme
Court.76 The Court has acknowledged the "serious constitu-
72 478 U.S. 833, 847-59 (1986).
71Ic at 847 (1986). Professor Richard EL Fallon articulates three values that
underlie the Article III guarantees of life tenure and salary stabilization. The first
is those values that are implicit in the separation of powers principle, such as pro-
tection from arbitrary and capricious results that may occur with the broad con-
centration of power over an issue within one branch of the government The sec-
ond is fairness to litigants in the face of partial officials within the executive or
legislative branches. Finally, Professor Fallon notes that the integrity of the judi-
cial branch is dependant upon the ability to review the basic lawfulness of an
agency's action. Fallon, supra note 59, at 937-942.
" Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
' Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589-93
(1984)).
' See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984); Southern
R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Mining Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 462 (1979); Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 US. 136, 141
(1967); Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 670-77 (1960). In the Article m analysis
of Schor, the Court articulates that the distinction between the public versus pri-
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tional question" that arises upon the interpretation of a statute
which denies any judicial forum to a colorable constitutional
claim." So meaningful is the right, that prior to such a pre-
clusion, congressional intent to do so must be clear.7"
Yet the legislative history of the AEDPA does not clearly
address congressional intent to eliminate judicial review with
regard to the removal of lawful resident aliens with an enu-
merated conviction. Congressional testimonies imply that opin-
ion as to the alien removal procedures of the AEDPA are am-
biguous at best.79 House and Senate hearings that led to the
creation of the bill discuss the exclusion and deportation of
"terrorists," but do not profoundly address the preclusion of
judicial review upon final deportation orders directed at legal
aliens.80 Rather, it appears that the removal procedures were
a last-minute addition to the statute, thereby avoiding genuine
debate over their constitutionality."' Proponents of the alien
removal procedures were able to ride the political wave, as
Congress' desire to pass the Act on the anniversary date of the
Oklahoma City bombing obscured the impropriety of the provi-
sions."
vate nature of a right will be noted. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853. The deference that
may be given to a "private" right-one for which state law provides the rule of
decision-is not to be dispositive. Id. at 853-54. The right to judicial review of a
final deportation order would qualify as a "public right," as it arises "between the
Government and the persons subject to its authority in connection with the perfor-
mance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments."
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
7 But see Morawetz, supra note 50, at 100 n.17.
7 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (citing Johnson v. Robinson,
415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974)). See also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 (1986).
"' Debate essentially revolved around the AEDPA's terrorist designations, and
its habeas corpus and asylum revisions. 142 CONG. REC. H3605; see also 104 S.
REP. No. 48 (1995). On these topics, the bill was often critiqued as "excessively
harsh where it ought not to be, and much too weak where [it] needis) toughness."
142 CONG. REC. H3605, 3609.
" See generally Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"s Answer to Terrorism, 73
IND. L.J. 693 (1998).
81 See generally Reuben, supra note 4.
82 See generally Reuben, supra note 4. "The changes [in the AEDPA] were
made without legislative debate and without regard for other, more comprehensive
efforts at reform that were nearing completion . . . . Only a handful of people
knew that these provisions were slipped in there, and were changing law that's
been around for decades . . . ." Id. at 34 (quoting Carol Wolchok, staff liaison for
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Even if congressional intent with regard to this provision
of the AEDPA were clear,' the Supreme Court has "never
held that Congress may eliminate all access to judicial review
over the core constitutional rights of due process and liberty
that are at issue in a deportation order."' This leads to the
somewhat broader consideration of the AEDPA legisla-
tion--does Congress possess the power to eliminate review of
final deportation orders as performed by the "independent
adjudicator" as characterized by the Article MI courts?'
Such congressional delegations are riddled in contradiction and
ABA Coordinating Committee on Immigration Law). Buttressing this perspective is
the INS's apparent disappointment with the provisions that eliminated judicial
review. David Martin, INS General Counsel, stated that the removal procedures in
the AEDPA were done in haste, and 'did not receive sufficient scrutiny." Id.
This Note does not suggest a lack of evidence of congressional and executive
intent to increase the removal of immigrants convicted of crimes in general. To
the contrary, such plans have existed for some time. See Containing Costs of In-
carceration of Federal Prisoners and Detainees: Prisons and Related Issues: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, State, and Justice of the House Appropri-
ations Comm., 104th Cong., at 106-63 (1995) (testimony of James A. Puleo, Execu-
tive Associate Commissioner for Programs at the INS calling for the 'expediting of
the identification and removal of criminal alien?). However, such intentions are
not manifest in the debate surrounding the AEDPA, which supports the contention
that the provisions of the AEDPA did not receive the appropriate scrutiny.
' See Brief for the Respondent, Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996).
The United States contends that congressional intent to eliminate judicial review
through § 440(a) of the AEDPA is clear. To that end, they cite Senator Abraham:
The provisions at issue... require that aliens who are convicted of
serious crimes in courts of law in this country be deported upon comple-
tion of their sentences without further judicial review. These expedited
deportation procedures will apply to almost half a million aliens currently
residing in this country who are deportable because they have been con-
victed of serious felonies. (citations omitted).
Id. at 10. But see Morawetz, supra note 50, at 100 n.17 (noting that the United
States Department of Justice contends that constitutional questions are excepted
from the AEDPA's removal of judicial review).
" Brief for the Petitioner at n.7, Lewin v. INS, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996).
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Feder-
al Courts: An Exercise in Dialect, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953); see also
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 898 (1984).
Deportation proceedings are conducted by a Special Inquiry Officer (immigra-
tion judge). These individuals are accountable to the same bureaucracy which
investigates the aliens. 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4) (1994). Thus, their impartiality when
reviewing the determinations made by the investigators is questionable.
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controversy, found not only in scholarly commentary,86 but
also in the Supreme Court decisions themselves.
The elimination of judicial review mandated by the
AEDPA is arguably an impermissible usurpation of "the essen-
tial attributes of judicial power' of the judiciary. The provi-
sion eliminates, in its entirety, the possibility of reviewing an
agency action that has been challenged as unconstitutional.
Thus, "the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercis-
es ... powers normally vested in the Article III courts," may
be characterized as an absolute transfer of those functions
traditionally performed by the judiciary. 9 In this sense, the
AEDPA delegates unfettered control to the INS, a non-Article
III tribunal, to police or check the agency's own actions. The
INS becomes the sole arbiter of legal aliens' due process
rights.' While Congress undoubtedly possesses substantial
discretion to proscribe the manner in which a right they have
created may be adjudicated,9 the right to review of a final
proceeding to ensure that it comports with the Constitution is
not a congressionally created principle.92 As such the elimina-
tion of all means of independent oversight should be barred as
an illegitimate encroachment upon the judicial power that is
retained by Article III.
" "Although Schor takes significant steps ... its call for ad hoe judgements
indicates a continuing acceptance of doctrinal uncertainty." Fallon, supra note 59,
at 932.
8 "The Supreme Courts jurisprudence concerning the power to substitute leg-
islative courts and administrative agencies for 'constitutional courts' created under
[Airticle III has long been abounded with confusion." Fallon, supra note 59, at
916. See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: Confusion
Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOK L. REV. 207 (1983); Millard, supra note
66, at 669; Commodity Futures Trading Common v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
89 Id.
" This "wholesale importation . . .of jurisdiction" has left even the INS ques-
tioning the statute's breadth. Reuben, supra note 4, at 2. Paul Virtue, Deputy
General Counsel for the INS, states that the AEDPA "leaves [the INS] with no
choice. We think that the statute ought to, be changed, and we are working on
that, but until it is, we have to enforce it." Reuben, supra note 4, at 2.
'l Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 80.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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2. Factor Three: The Purpose of the AEDPA Juxtaposed
Against the Departure From Article III Norms
The third and final factor of the Schor test is the purpose
behind the Act, or the "concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III."' The underlying pur-
pose of the AEDPA is to afford American citizens greater pro-
tection against acts of terrorism." To that end, numerous pro-
vision of the AEDPA relate to such issues as the designation of
terrorist organizations and explosives tagging." Yet with re-
gard to the AEDPA's criminal alien removal procedures, Con-
gress moved beyond the scope of its legitimate anti-terrorism
purpose. This is not to suggest that the concern over the cur-
rent state of immigration policy in the United States is un-
founded." However, a counter-terrorism statute, packed with
complex provisions denoting terrorist behavior, is an inappro-
priate forum in which to address such immigration concerns.
This is particularly evident due to the broad scope of the
AEDPA's revisions. The fate of a resident alien's liberty inter-
est with reference to final orders of deportation should not be
dramatically reconstructed in the heat of anti-terrorist fervor.
Ultimately, the AEDPA has rewritten immigration law so
that lawful resident aliens may be deported from the United
States for a minor criminal offense committed in years past,
without judicial review to ensure just proceedings. The enforce-
ment of section 440(a) of the AEDPA permits what is "essen-
tially a police agency to also decide guilt and innocence.'
Moreover, this power is executed in the absence of the underly-
ing values of fairness and equity historically protected by Arti-
cle HII review of final orders of deportation.
" Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
See generally AEDPA, supra note 3.
To the contrary, it has been noted that there is [rlising American concern
over a perceived immigration crisis .... ." Linda S. Bosaink, Membership, Equality,
and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1047 (1994).
' Charles Finnie, Playing Cop and Judge; Is the INS Suited to Handle the
Deportation Powers it gained Under New Anti-terrorism Law? AMERICAN LAWYER
MEDIA, L.P. THE RECORDER, May 10, 1996, at 1.
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III. SECTION 440 OF THE AEDPA WITHIN A DUE PROCESS
CONTExT: THE USE OF CONGRESS' PLENARY POWER TO
BALANCE AWAY LAWFUL RESIDENT ALIENS' CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS
The United States Supreme Court had at one time articu-
lated that the only procedural due process protections available
to aliens are notice and the opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 8 Congress'
ability to grant aliens' no greater rights than these was justi-
fied by the plenary power that it is said to enjoy over immigra-
tion law." Thus, while the power to regulate immigration is
not among those expressly granted to Congress by the constitu-
tion, it had been stated that "over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over
[immigration] .."oo
9 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See also Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
9" Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552. Justice Felix Frankfurter described the plenary
power as follows: "[Tihe underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be al.
lowed to enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Con.
gress exclusively to determine even though such determination may be deemed to
offend American traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace."
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The plenary power has also been defined as a doctrine which "allows the govern-
ment to subordinate the interests of aliens to the perceived interests of the na-
tion . .. ." Bosniak, supra note 96, 1047.
1" Oceanic Stream Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (up-
holding tax on carriers which had transported illegal aliens). The Court has also
stated "[wihatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned." United States ex. rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) ("it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into
immigration legislation"); Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-766 (1972) ("reaf-
firmations of [the plenary power doctrine] have been legion"); Shaughnessy v. Unit-
ed States e= rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
The doctrine emanating from Knauff and Mezei have been greatly criticized.
See Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration
Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 35, 44-47 (Summer 1996); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2021 (1984) (rule from
the cases validates "deplorable governmental conduct toward both aliens and
American citizens); John Figgis, Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and
the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1322-24 (1983) (cases are anomalous
in that they suggest that no constitutional restraints exist upon Congress' exercise
of its exclusion power).
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Yet Congress' plenary power remains subject to constitu-
tional restraints.'O For example, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that even aliens who are unlawfully on American soil
possess a "substantive due process right to liberty during de-
portation proceedings."0 2 Within this context, the Court has
stated that it is "the role of the judiciary... [to] determin[e]
whether procedures meet the essential fairness of the Due
Process Clause,"103 and that "[m]eticulous care must be exer-
cised lest the [deportation] procedure... not meet th[is] essen-
tial standards of fairness."04
Such judicial oversight is particularly important in the
instance of legal permanent residents, who have a stronger
claim to due process protection than illegal aliens.' As the
Court has stated, "[tihe point is straight forward: the Due
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life,
liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures."0 s Consequently, it
would appear that judicial review is a necessary procedural
protection upon a challenge to a resident alien's substantive
right to liberty. Yet prior to such a determination, those rights
currently granted to legal aliens must be evaluated.
A. The Constitutional Protections Afforded Resident Aliens
There is great ambiguity that surrounds the application of
constitutional law to the due process claims of aliens. One
commentator stated, "little constitutional immigration law has
ever taken root."0 7 In the 1886 decision Yick Wo v.
,0, Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Souereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987); Bosniak,
supra note 96, at 1092.
1" Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed,
Doherty v. Barr, 503 U.S. 901 (1992). See also St. John v. McElroy, 917 F. Supp.
243, 246-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (the liberty interest possessed by legal permanent
residents "is of the highest constitutional import"); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 US.
21, 34 (1982).
10 Landon, 459 U.S. at 34.
.0. Bridges v. Wilson, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
0 Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
106 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 US. 532, 541 (1985). See also
FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S.
252 (1987).
10 Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
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Hopkins,1"8 the Supreme Court held that aliens are deemed
"persons for the purposes of Fourteenth Amendment
protections.""9 This determination is said to have extended to
aliens many of the protections found within the Bill of
Rights." 0
Yet the Court has also acknowledged a 'limited judicial re-
sponsibility under the Constitution" to review immigration
policy."' The first time that the Court heard a due process
claim premised upon a denial of judicial review of a deporta-
tion order was in 1903. In Yamataya v. Fisher, the Supreme
Court declared:
[Tihis court has never held, nor must now be understood as holding,
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a
statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the funda-
mental principles that inhere in the "due process of law" as under-
stood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution."'
Despite decades of such pronouncements made by the
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1626
(1992) [hereinafter Motomura, Procedural Surrogates]. Professor Motomura provides
an extensive history of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning deportation and
due process rights afforded aliens that were acknowledged, yet rarely applied on a
practical level. The article also contends that "[blecause of the anomalous structure
that the plenary power doctrine imposes on constitutional immigration law, proce-
dural decision are often the only vehicle for taking substantive constitutional
rights seriously, and procedural surrogates for substantive constitutional rights
have evolved as a result." Id. at 1631.
10 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
101 Id. at 369.
"o Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1060-61. See also Motomura, Procedural Surro-
gates, supra note 107, at 1627; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Cen-
tury of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,
100 YALE L.J. 545, 566 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Norms]; T. Alexan-
der Aleinkoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AL. J. INTL L.
862, 865 (1989); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. P1iT. L. REV. 165, 180 (1983).
.. Rodriguez v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977).
1 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). See also United States ex. rel. Vajtauer v. Commis-
sioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) ("[d]eporation without a fair hear-
ing or on charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial of due process"); Unit-
ed States ex. rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133 (1924) (error of an administrative
tribunal "may ... be so flagrant as to convince a court that the [deportation]
hearing was not a fair one"). Cf Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) ("fair
though summary hearing" by immigration officials may be constitutionally conclu-
sive). It appears that there is a "readiness to recite the procedural due process
requirement and a reluctance to apply it for the alien's benefit." Motomura, Proce-
dural Surrogates, supra note 107, at 1643.
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Court,"3 there remains considerable controversy over wheth-
er or not procedural safeguards such as judicial review remain
a due process guarantee afforded to aliens.
Historically, judicial review of an agency determination
has taken the form of a requirement when a tribunal seeks to
enforce a duty or obligation upon an unwilling defendant."'
However, commentators have noted that courts have consis-
tently refused to review the substantive content of federalimmigration statutes for compliance with constitutional guar-
antees. 5 This is in contrast to the "flowering constitutional
protections" that have developed for aliens in arenas other
than immigration law.,"
Even modern Supreme Court decisions lend themselves to
contradiction. For example, as articulated, the Court has stat-
ed that the only due process concerns of an alien subject to
removal are proper notice and the opportunity to be heard in
an administrative setting."7 Yet within that same case, the
Court also stated that the power to deport is "subject to judi-
cial intervention under the paramount law of the Constitu-
tion," implying that the basic requirements of due process
remain, and that upon a claimed violation, an independent
judicial remedy must remain available.' It has been said
that:
1I3 United States en- rel. Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 106 ("[djeporation without a fair
hearing or on charges unsupported by the evidence is a denial of due process");
United States ex rel. Tisi, 264 U.S. at 134 (error of administrative tribunal
"may... be so flagrant as to convince a court that the [deportation] hearing was
not a fair one"); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912) (hearing may
be conclusive if fairly conducted). Cf Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 ("fair
though summary hearing" by immigration official may be constitutionally conclu-
sive). It appears that there is a "readiness to recite the procedural due process
requirement and a reluctance to apply it for the alien's benefit." Motmura, Proce-
dural Surrogates, supra note 107, at 1643.
... See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 US. 568, 587 (1984);
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUJ. L. REV. 1,
16 (1983).
"11 See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 713-14; Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of the Plenary Congressional Power,
1884 Sup. CT. REV. 255, 256; Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 107, at
1626 (1992).
1 Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 107, at 1626.
17 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-38 (1952).
m Id. at 533 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-15, 728
(1893)).
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The moment any human being from a country at peace with us
comes within the jurisdiction of the United States... he becomes
subject to all their laws, is amenable to their punishment and enti-
tled to their protection. Arbitrary and despotic power can no more be
exercised over them with reference to their persons and property,
than over the persons and property of native-born citizens. They
differ only from citizens in that they cannot vote or hold any public
office. As men having our common humanity, they are protected by
all the guarantees of the constitution."9
Such a representation of an aliens' substantive rights is
evident in Plyler v. Doe,'20 where the Court intimates a will-
ingness to recognize the constitutional claims of illegal immi-
grants.' In Plyler, the Court struck down a state regulation
denying public education to children of illegal aliens. The
Court refused to classify public education as a fundamental
"right" granted by the Constitution.'22 However, the Court
also refused to term it as a mere " 'benefit' indistinguishable
from other forms of social welfare legislation.""2 Rather, the
Court reaffirmed the principle that an alien's presence on
American soil is not a "constitutional irrelevancy," and sug-
gested that public education fell within the nebulous area upon
the continuum of liberties that exist for aliens.24
... Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 754 (Field J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
120 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(failure to rehire nontenured university professor without hearing relating to termi-
nation not a violation of due process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (wel-
fare recipient is entitled to a evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of bene-
fits); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (full trial court hearing necessary
prior to termination of nontenured college professor's position). See generally Doug
Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L.J. 531 (1975),
Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth
and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1983).
... See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). In Landon, the Court ex-
pressed a willingness to recognize the due process rights of an alien who had left
the country briefly and was attempting to reenter. Id. at 36-37.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
'Id.
Id. at 219. There has been substantial scholarly discussion over the erosion
of the plenary doctrine, and the introduction of more conventional constitutional
rights into the sphere of immigration law. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1062,
1130; Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 110, at 606; Schuck, supra note 100,
at 75. See generally Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 107.
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B. The Mathews Test
It is through such a continuum of privileges, entitlements,
and rights that the elimination of judicial review of deportation
orders mandated by the AEDPA, as it relates to an alien's
liberty interest, must be evaluated. In the 1976 case, Mathews
v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court set forth a three-part test that
is to be used for determining the scope of the due process
protections afforded to a claim that an agency policy consti-
tutes an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.' In
Mathews, the Court confronted the issue of whether or not a
hearing was necessary prior to a termination of Social Security
disability benefit payments in order to comport with the re-
quirements of due process."6 The Court set forth three fac-
tors to include in the analysis: (1) the private interests that are
to be affected by the official administrative action; (2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the proce-
dures that are used-and the value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards; and (3) the government interest in-
volved, including the costs that additional or substitute proce-
dural requirements would entail.'
The first prong of Mathews, the interest implicated by the
AEDPA, is noted as its purported purpose: to "deter terrorism,
provide justice for victims, [and to] provide for an effective
Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 US. 21,
34 (1982) (Court applies the Mathews analysis to the expulsion procedures afforded
legal permanent aliens.).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
Id. Many of the courts that have heard challenges to the AEDPA provision
at issue accept the conclusion that the court is divested of jurisdiction with little
to no analysis in support of this conclusion. See, eg., Arevalo-Lopez v. INS, 104
F.3d 100 (7th Cir. 1997); Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (lst Cir. 1996); Solorio-
Almanza v. INS, 101 F.3d 706 (9th Cir 1996).
It is interesting to note that the Mathews test has previously been used to
determine that certain AEDPA provisions are unconstitutional as applied to lawful
permanent residents. In Thomas v. McElroy, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that an AEDPA revision which mandated
the detention of a released aggravated felon prior to an excludablity determination
was constitutionally infirm. No. 96 Civ. 5065, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12445
(S.D.N.Y. August 23, 1996). As in Thomas, the application of the Mathews analysis
to the elimination of judicial review mandated by §440(a) the AEDPA illustrates
that the denial of Article II review uniformly to all deportation orders constitutes
a violation of due process guarantees of lawful permanent residents.
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death penalty."'28 Yet this must be juxtaposed against the
liberty interest afforded legal aliens-or the freedom from a
deportation order issued at an unjust or infirm procedure. This
interest has been deemed "of the highest order in the realm of
individual rights."'29 In light of the severe consequence of an
irreversible final order of deportation, the procedures implicat-
ing this right must be independently scrutinized.' 0 Moreover,
the conclusion that a possible deprivation of liberty interest
necessitates impartial review finds further support in the Su-
preme Court's implication that the constitutional standard ap-
plied to deportation proceedings is greater than that necessary
for the exclusion of aliens.'3 '
Significantly, the Mathews framework permits "review of
some unconstitutional rights of sufficient importance."'
3 2
Thus, even in the absence of recognizing the implication of a
liberty interest pursuant to a deportation order, the require-
ment of independent adjudication remains warranted. 3 3 The
Court has stated that while generally it will not interfere upon
a finding of fact by the executive agency, the judiciary should
11 AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
119 Thomas, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12445 at *8.
13 It has been suggested that "[w]hile more recent decisions of lower courts and
even of the Supreme Court seem to indicate greater solicitude for the due process
claims of aliens, such rights have not yet been recognized generally." David Moyce,
Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process Under The Immigration
Laws, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1747, 1759 (1986). See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADIMNISTRATIVE ACTION 648 (1965) (implying that review of administrative ac-
tion may be necessary where the determination carries "grave consequences to the
individual").
131 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 47-48 (1982). The concept of exclusion
differs from that of deportation, the latter of which is presently at issue. Exclusion
proceedings commence when an alien has attempted to enter the United States,
but is denied entry due to some provision of the INA. Deportation proceedings
occur when an alien has already entered, whether or not this has been accom-
plished by lawful means. For a thorough discussion of the term "entry," and the
difference between exclusion and deportation, see FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note
12, at 7-1 to 7-5.
13 Judah A. Schecter, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Factu.
al Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1502
(1988). Schecter notes that Professor Jaffe also suggests such a possibility. 'An
interest similar to that implicated in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922),
the existence of which 'makes life worth living,' id. at 284, would certainly fall
within this category." Id. at n.14.
13 See discussion of the nature and importance of judicial review of administra-
tive actions supra note 103-16 and accompanying text.
1406 [Wol. 63:1381
1997] THE ANTI-TERRORSMAND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTYACT 1407
intervene upon various claims, where, for example, (1) the
finding was not supported by the evidence, (2) there was an
erroneous application of the law,'3 or (3) there was a denial
to a fair hearing."r Such claims are precisely those left un-
protected by the AEDPA's mandatory preclusion of judicial
review.
The second Mathews factor-the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of the right-is of great concern, s6 and necessitates the
evaluation of many issues. Among these are: (1) the expertise
and experience of the agency with regard to the issue raised;
(2) the procedural protections provided by the agency; and (3)
the degree of bias or "institutional tunnel vision."' There is
no question that the INS possesses both the technical expertise
and experience to determine the grounds for deportation of an
alien. Yet this expertise does not extend to challenges of depor-
tation orders premised upon a constitutional violation.' The
agency's skill in this instance cannot parallel that of Article I
review, which is the "traditional and historic means of ensur-
ing that a procedure comported with due process. " '
Moreover, the procedural protection of review by the BIA
does little to counter this dilemma, as the absence of indepen-
dent adjudication remains. The possibility of legal errors made
by the BIA is the exact evil that the judicial review of final
1 It has been stated by the Court that 'the reservation of full authority to the
court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the
judicial function.. . ." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932).
Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added). See also Gegiow v. Uh, 239
U.S. 3 (1915); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908); American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
'1 Article III courts have vacated or reversed BIA decisions based upon both
legal and factual errors. See, e.g., Gomez-Saballos v. INS, 79 F.3d 912, 917 (9th
Cir. 1996) (lack of expertise in assessing relevant country conditions); Delmundo v.
INS, 43 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1994) (considering irrelevant factors and evidence);
Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 343 (9th Cir. 1994) (decided cases based on specula-
tion and through the use of boilerplate language); Braun v. INS, 992 F.2d 1016,
1020 (9th Cir. 1993); Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 650 (9th Cir. 1993) (misin-
terpretations of the INA); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 727 (9th Cir.
1990), vacated, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the wrong standard of law).
' Schecter, supra note 132, at 1502-03 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
114 (1985); Buettner v. City of St. Cloud, 277 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Minn. 1979)). See
also Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. Rzv. 229, 262
(1985) (noting the historic distrust of agency adjudication).
' It has been stated that the fairness and administrative competence of the
INS has been "harshly criticized." Schuck, supra note 100, at 16.
1 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 668, 587 (1984).
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deportation orders was designed to protect against. The neces-
sity of such review has not gone unnoticed. For example, Chief
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has stated that, "[t]he pro-
ceedings of the Immigration and Naturalization Service are
notorious for delay, and the opinions rendered by its judicial
officers, including the members of the Board of Immigration
Appeals, often flunk minimum standards of adjudicative ratio-
nality.14 o
And finally, with reference to the third Mathews factor,
the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards, which would be akin to the procedures that were in
place prior to AEDPA's enactment, is great. To reinstate circuit
court review would provide a means by which to ensure that
the deportation proceeding comported with the requirements of
due process. Judicial review would provide the procedural
protection necessary to prevent possible impingement of the
substantive right to liberty.
Viewed from the fiscal perspective, it again appears that
pre-AEDPA procedures are more beneficial. The government's
interest in enacting the AEDPA was to create a tool by which
the government would protect the citizenry from the violence
perpetrated by acts of terrorism. To this end, the Act autho-
rized a disbursement of one billion dollars over a four year
period for these counter-terrorism efforts, of which the FBI will
receive the largest share.' Without equivalent resources,
implementation of the AEDPA's removal procedures increases
the burden placed upon the INS.' Due to the AEDPA's re-
quirement, the INS is being forced to engage in "wholesale and
costly reordering of agency hiring, training, and organization,
[which] threatens to strain INS detention facilities."' In es-
sence, as the INS provides the traditional adjudicative func-
o Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). See,
e.g., Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1995); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d
1017, 1028-30 (2d Cir. 1994); Osmani v. INS, 14 F.3d 13, 14 (7th Cir. 1994);
Roderiguez-Barajas v. INS, 922 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993); Bastanipour v. INS,
980 F.2d 1129, 1131, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992); Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163-
64 (7th Cir. 1991).
... Perl, supra note 1, at 15.
" It has been noted that the INS is "absurdly understaffed." Salameda, 70
F.3d at 449. In 1994, the BIA had an effective membership of four who were to
handle the more than 14,000 appeals that they received that year. Id.
4 Finnie, supra note 97, at 1.
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tions mandated by the AEDPA, a larger fiscal and administra-
tive burden is placed upon the agency than that which the
substitute procedural requirement of Article In review would
entail.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Several circuits have found that the AEDPA does not vio-
late the Constitution by either the summary elimination of
judicial review or the aforementioned separation of powers
analysis.' Yet even upon the alternative determination that
AEDPA is not violative of a lawful resident alien's due process
rights, the statute should be amended as it is unjust in its
current form.45 Section 440(a) is riddled with constitutional
questions as to the legitimacy of its scope. Its controversial
nature has not gone unnoticed, and some commentators have
suggested that the bill be revised by Congress."'
Revisions that Congress should consider include reinstat-
ing Francis relief for permanent resident aliens. By doing so,
the conflict between the constitutional rights granted to the
legal aliens and the purpose behind the legislation is averted.
1" See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996); mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87
F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996); Hincapie-
Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996). Cf. Reyes.Hernandez v. INS. 89 F.3d 490
(7th Cir. 1996).
"4 The elimination of INA § 212(c) discretionary waiver by the immigration
judge and the restriction of habeas corpus relief, act in conjunction with the afore-
mentioned elimination of judicial review to result in an unfair statute that leaves
a final deportation order unprotected from abuse. While elaborate discussion of
these provision are beyond the scope of this Note, they deserve mention.
Section 440(d) of the AEDPA amends §212(c) of the INA, malng this discre-
tionary waiver unavailable to those aliens who have been convicted of an enumer-
ated offense. Factors that were ordinarily considered when making such a determi-
nation include: (1) family ties in the United States; (2) the length of time that the
alien resident has spent in the United States; (3) the length of time that the alien
has spent employed; and (4) evidence of hardship that may occur upon the alien's
deportation. Moreover, there is no 'savings clause" in the AEDPA, which would
ordinarily preserve an avenue of relief for an alien who was convicted prior to the
statute's enactment. This elimination would still hold despite evidence that the
offense was committed long ago, and evidence that since release, the alien has
remained a productive and law abiding resident. See supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text;, see generally Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws
and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998) (addressing the relation-
ship between IIRIRA and the AEDPA).
' See generally Perl, supra note 1.
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Such action also would eliminate the separation of powers con-
cerns that stem from the AEDPA's revisions, as the principle of
the independent adjudicator, safeguarding the liberty interest
that is possessed by a lawful resident alien, would be reinstat-
ed. Providing discretionary relief based upon a balance of the
equities will also acknowledge the heightened protection grant-
ed to the rights of lawful residents, and will be consistent with
the current trend of constitutional immigration law.
Congress may also consider clearly delineating those of-
fenses that qualify as a crime of moral turpitude, while nar-
rowing the definition of acts that constitute an "aggravated
felony." This would insulate legal aliens from broad agency
interpretations of these terms and may help exclude those
aliens who committed petty offenses from the harsh deporta-
tion penalty. Finally, Congress should articulate a particular
time frame of post-conviction lawful behavior and evidence of
rehabilitation as explicit factors to be weighed by the INS
within the deportability equation.
Such legislative amendments would soften the harsh blow
which the AEDPA has visited upon legal permanent resident
aliens. It would also provide a firmer nexus between the depor-
tation of aliens with prior convictions and the goal of the legis-
lation-protecting the American citizenry from acts of terror-
ism.
Lisa C. Solbakken
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